The Growth of
Science
We often think that
science grows by progressing slowly but steadily along some kind of path
towards the final ‘Truth’. However, the growth of science is not really like
this clear-cut, straightforward progression at all. There are a number of
different factors that affect the way and the direction in which our scientific
knowledge develops, some of these are:
First, the choice of
problems on which the scientist decides to work depends on such
considerations as political and social pressures (e.g. for pollution control
and population control, and against investigating genetic factors in
intelligence); financial rewards (e.g. what the government will subsidize or
industry support); ethical incentives (e.g. “it is better to do biology than
physics”); expediency or the state of the discipline (e.g. the availability of
computers and other equipment); the urgency of the problem compared with its
difficulty (biologists, for example, are now facing the decision as to whether
it is worthwhile to complete the taxonomy of living creatures)
Second, there are
fortuitous, or chance, elements in scientific progress; some famous
discoveries have been accidental (Fleming and penicillin, Büchner
and enzymes, Becquerel and the radioactive emission from uranium). There are
fashions in ideas; ecology is now “in”; Mendel’s paper was ignored for decades.
There are, moreover, accidents of personality (in scientific ability, in who
makes up the scientific establishment).
Third, how the scientist
hits on a new hypothesis is a mystery (“like a flash … an act of
insight”—Peirce; “by intuition, based upon Einfühlung”—Einstein).
What has been called the logic of discovery is obscure, perhaps
below the level of conscious awareness, perhaps similar to the creativity of
the artist. Even the designing of an experiment “becomes an art” (Kelvin). The
scientist is not ipso facto the best judge of his own mental processes, any
more than anyone else is.
Fourth, there are extrascientific
influences, not merely on the choice of problems by the scientist, but on
the conclusions at which he arrives: religion (against Darwinian evolution) ;
politics (for Lysenko and the transmission of acquired characteristics, in the
Soviet Union); philosophy (toward deterministic or indeterministic
interpretations of quantum mechanics) ; social policy (the French Academy denied
for a long time that there were any such things as meteorites, because they
feared that an ignorant peasantry might consider them to be supernatural).
Adapted from Reuben Abel’s ‘Man is the Measure’ (Chapter 10)